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The English context
The ambitious National Health Service (NHS) infor-
mation technology (IT) plan, announced in 2002,
aims to modernise the health service by developing a
centralised approach to IT delivery that will improve
infrastructure and rationalise the purchasing of sys-
tems so as to avoid incompatibility, reduce costs and
maximise eﬃciency.1 The National Programme for IT
(NPfIT) will upgrade information management and
technology (IM&T) infrastructure to support a broad-
band NHS network and deliver national systems to
enable electronic care records, transfer of electronic
prescriptions and electronic appointment booking.
Preliminary scoping and commissioning activities
took place between April 2002 and March 2003, and
included a number of formative projects conducted
under the auspices of theNHSModernisationAgency,
such as the e-bookings pilot.2 However, the main
phase of software development and implementation
is at an early stage. It may therefore be instructive to
consider experiences and lessons learned from the
comparable Scottish programme.
Issues of concern
Readers of Informatics in Primary Care will no doubt
be aware of the plethora of recentmedia reports on the
topic of NPfIT, as well as commentaries in the scien-
tiﬁc press. In the main these have been highly critical,
emphasising the potential failings and risks of the
programme.3–5 Among the issues highlighted have
been: for clinicians – fears over the potential utility
and reliability of systems, lack of awareness, and
resistance to system imposition; for health authorities
– uncertainty over long-term ﬁnancing and impli-
cations for existing useful IM&T systems; and from a
strategic perspective – lack of clarity over supplier
commissioning and interoperability. Other concerns
have been voiced at the short timescale available for
the current phase, the political motivation for rapid
delivery and the potential for cost escalation.6
While the type of problems alluded to in the media
might strike the casual reader as particularly damning
to the NPfIT, it is important to point out that these
experiences are far from unique and regularly beset
complex civic and commercial programmes across the
globe, as attested to by the wealth of books and reports
on the topic of IM&T implementation. Nonetheless,
awareness of the barriers and facilitators to complex
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IT programme implementation remains poor and as a
result key safeguards are often neglected. During the
comparable programme north of the Border, the
Scottish Executive Health Department demonstrated
considerable foresight in commissioning a unique
participative evaluation process which enabled aca-
demic researchers to feed back early observations in
order to facilitate its development. Unsurprisingly the
programme experienced a range of common barriers
to progress, but the open and responsive attitude of
government policy makers and implementers to feed-
back meant that the majority of these were resolved.
The Scottish context
The Electronic Clinical Communications Implemen-
tation Programme (ECCI) was initiated in 2000 with
an intended end date of March 2003, later extended to
2005.7 It is part of the NHS Scotland eHealth Strategy,
which includes a commitment to implementing the
universal patient identiﬁer, enabling record linkage
and thereby integrated electronic health records.8 The
overriding objective of ECCI was to promote the
electronic exchange of clinically relevant information
between primary and secondary care. It targeted six
key ‘deliverables’ relating to direct hospital outpatient
appointment booking from primary care; referral from
primary to secondary care; results reporting from
secondary care laboratories to primary care; transfer
of hospital discharge and clinic letters to primary care;
and clinical email (for example, second opinion cor-
respondence). A related objective was to implement
integration tools to enable information to be shared
between IT systems. At the outset of the programme it
had been envisaged that the focus of ECCI would be
implementation. A parallel initiative known as Scottish
Care Information (SCI) had been separately funded to
produce national computing systems for achieving
ECCI.9 Since the English programme is part of a broader
strategy incorporating a range of infrastructure, de-
velopment and implementation initiatives, it is not
exactly comparable with ECCI, although the parallels
with this and the wider Scottish programme are
obvious.
Our research teamwas contracted to evaluate ECCI
between October 2001 and November 2003 and our
methods and broad ﬁndings are described in detail
elsewhere.10 Summarised here are some key lessons
learned from this exercise, and from our more general
observations of IM&T implementation.
Observations, recommendations
and lessons learned
Complex IT projects usually take
longer than anticipated and cost
more than initially estimated
Delays are inevitable, not just because it can take
longer than expected to develop systems with appro-
priate functionality and interoperability, but also
because such systems need to be shown to work in
the environments for which they are intended and to
meet the needs of the users they are intended to serve
and may therefore require several iterations. Achieving
the human and organisational change necessary to im-
plement new systems is commonly evenmore time- and
resource-intensive thandeveloping the technology itself.
While it can be understandably tempting for pro-
gramme planners to forecast early completion, this
can put the programme at risk of apparent failure. An
unrealistically short timescale has been a very damag-
ing factor in past IT projects that have ﬂoundered. In
Scotland the two main strands of the national pro-
grammewere originally intended to complement each
other, but diﬃculties with the development of national
software solutions (SCI) delayed the implementation
phase (ECCI) by around a year. The extra timewas not
wasted in that most teams used it to address infra-
structure issues andmany developed unique solutions
to achieving the deliverables. However, the hiatus
between strategy phases generated additional resource
demands since money and teams had been committed
to the project based on the original time-frame. The
delay also threatened the morale of ECCI project
teams, whose initial goals were frustrated and whose
immediate objectives had to be modiﬁed. Furthermore,
it risked reversing the motivational eﬀects of early
awareness-raising activities conducted with health
professionals. These problems were limited by an
active process of information sharing between project
teams, facilitated by central staﬀ, which oﬀered peer
support to regional implementation personnel and
provided an opportunity for interim solutions to be
disseminated.
It should also be borne in mind that even once
systems are ready to be used and have been installed,
there may be a considerable ‘cranking-up’ phase,
where progress is slow but users are preparing and
adapting to new ways of working. In ECCI, early
expectations of rapid progress were not met and
implementation was instead characterised by a very
gentle incline, which gained momentum only after
some time. Nonetheless, impressive gains in users’
readiness to adopt new technologies were evident at a
relatively early stage.10
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Never underestimate the complexity
of a multi-faceted programme
While ECCI was originally envisaged as a roll-out of
an integrated SCI product suite, the delay in national
systems passed the onus onto the 16 individual Scottish
regions to ﬁnd their own solutions. In light of their
competing priorities and their diﬀering local advisory
structures, cultures and IM&T infrastructures, each
chose to prioritise the six deliverables according to
their own perceived needs and interests. Moreover,
some chose to enhance their existing emerging systems,
others to develop new systems and others to purchase
commercial packages. Thus, from a smaller concep-
tual hub, a potential 96 diﬀerent IM&T sub-projects
became possible. Whilst overlap and the emergence of
successful national solutions limited technological
proliferation, there was nonetheless wide variability
in the nature of ECCI across regions during the pro-
gramme’s oﬃcial time-frame. Tracking this represented
a challenge for central management and external evalu-
ation. Policy makers need to plan for the emergence of
unexpected complexity by ensuring that budgetsmake
provision for adequate human resources. In Scotland,
rationalisation of systems is occurring as the new
national products come into place. The English exper-
ience might be less painful if a clear national product
suite has been adequately developed before imple-
mentation is expected, but regional variation should
still be anticipated. Nonetheless, it should be borne in
mind that in managing a successful change there is a
trade-oﬀ to bemade between the beneﬁts of supplying
new centrally developed solutions to aid standardisa-
tion and the costs of abandoning existing local tech-
nologies with which stakeholders are familiar and that
work well. In the case of ECCI, a few sites had well-
established IM&T strategies incorporating approaches
to achieving the nominated deliverables. These exist-
ing and emerging approaches were boosted by ECCI
ﬁnance, but this further adhered some regions to their
local bespoke solutions. Encouraging interoperability
between systems should ensure that when this situ-
ation arises in England the local and national systems
will work in harmony, although the challenges of
implementing appropriate standards should not be
underestimated.
Target realistic and timely outcomes
As with politically attractive time-scales, the temp-
tation to over-promise on the projected beneﬁts of a
new programme should be avoided. Importantly, it
might be premature to predict signiﬁcant eﬀects on
clinical outcomes or process latency. In the case of
ECCI, early forecasts of reduced waiting times and
improved patient experiences gave way to more realistic
expectations relating to stakeholder engagement,
system roll-out and changes in professional ways of
working. Larger beneﬁts could take many months or
years to become evident, and a great deal of eﬀort
might have to be expended simply to modify working
practices. In the early stages of technology implemen-
tation the cognitive demands of learning new systems
might even suppress eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness, with
gains not becoming evident until newways of working
have been established.
Avoid raising stakeholder
expectations unrealistically
In implementation programmes focused on changing
professional behaviour there is a tension between, on
the one hand, convincing your target group of the
beneﬁts their eﬀorts will reap and, on the other, raising
expectations unrealistically. Caution should be exer-
cised when promising early beneﬁts, since failing to
fulﬁl stakeholder expectations in a timely manner can
lead to dissatisfaction. In ECCI, outreach exercises
designed to raise the expectations of clinical stakeholders
and thereby increase receptiveness to new systems
threatened to backﬁre when the promised systems
failed to materialise or the functionality or perform-
ance of prototypes were not as users had envisaged.
The nature of any likely beneﬁts should also be made
clear early on, so as to avoid later disappointment. For
example, in ECCI, rapid electronic access to labora-
tory results was perceived to be convenient, desirable
and a potential universal ‘quick win’, as it involved less
cultural change andappeared less technicallydemanding
than other applications. However, it was not thought
to oﬀer any substantive beneﬁt in terms of primary
care delivery over paper-based reports, which arrived
at most practices within 24 hours. Similarly, it was
remarked that electronic booking did not guarantee
an earlier consultation and urgent appointments
could be booked as quickly using the telephone.
Involve end-users early in the process
of developing new systems and act on
their feedback
Failure to engage end-users in the process of develop-
ing new systems is a classic mistake in design projects.
While the stereotype of remote technocrats develop-
ing complicated gadgets that ordinary people can’t
operate is perhaps outdated, there is nevertheless a
tendency for bunker psychology to operate in large-
scale IT development programmes, particularly where
intellectual property is an issue or where time pres-
sures and sponsors demand rapid solutions and human
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resource constraints discourage communication. Ignor-
ing end-user involvement is like galloping towards the
ﬁnishing line without testing the track beforehand; it
can have damaging consequences which could defeat
the initial objective. Involving potential users in the
design of systems can help programmers to better
address stakeholder needs, test systems for their usability
and functionality so as to avoid potentially expensive
glitches post-roll-out, and engender a sense of owner-
ship which can facilitate implementation.11 This is espe-
cially important in complex domains such as health,
where comprehensive and detailed user requirements
are rarely established before development work starts.
The Scottish experience suggests that rapid appli-
cation development with insuﬃcient user input pro-
duces sub-optimal systems that engender negative
stakeholder attitudes and that only by seeking and
actively addressing input from end-users both in the
test environment and in ecologically realistic settings
can functional and acceptable systems be created.
As the Scottish Executive Health Department IM&T
Directorate correctly recognised early in the process,
the people, not the technologies, are the key issue for
implementation. This was evidenced by positive re-
sponses to emerging systems that were actively piloted
with users, as compared to more advanced ones that
were simply rolled out. This is in line with frequent
observations, in the medical informatics literature, of
stakeholder resistance to (and even active sabotage of)
systems which they perceive have been imposed upon
them. Clinical and allied staﬀ should be actively en-
gaged at all stages of the national programme and
should not be regarded as the ﬁnal cog of implemen-
tation.
Ensure communication and
integration between related
programmes
In a complex programme there needs to be good
communication between separate but complementary
initiatives in order to harmonise activities and avoid
duplication of eﬀort. Before it became apparent that
there would be a delay in the provision of national
products, the programme funding for ECCI had been
committed to local health boards, necessitating an
earlier than ideal start. Furthermore, pressure on the
ECCI management team to deliver a massive and
highly complex programme meant that the potential
beneﬁts of sharing strategies with a parallel redesign
programme (for example, process mapping) were not
suﬃciently explored, particularly in the early stages.
The English strategy should contain a commitment to
actively engage with related programmes in order to
capitalise on mutually beneﬁcial activities.
Clarify the conceptual nature of the
programme
While ECCI was originally conceived of as an im-
plementation programme, it rapidly evolved to be-
come a development and implementation programme,
with the balance of each varying across health boards
according to diﬀerences in existing technical infra-
structure and IM&T support services. Staﬀ charged
with implementing a new initiative will feel more
conﬁdent if the parameters of their task are clear
from the outset. In ECCI some regional teams found
themselves heavily involved in development initiatives,
including SCI. This was inevitable and had obvious
beneﬁts in terms of ensuring integration of the sister
programmes, but where development issues dominated,
key implementation activities, like organisational de-
velopment and training, dropped further down the
agenda, with consequences for stakeholder engage-
ment. Moreover, while ECCI and SCI were conceived
as diﬀerent programmes, and our research team was
explicitly contracted to look at the former, our obser-
vations revealed that the fate of ECCI was inextricably
entwined with that of SCI. The message for NPfIT is
that developers and implementers need to communi-
cate at every stage in order to capitalise on a shared
vision. Nonetheless, provided the changes can be fully
justiﬁed, programme co-ordinators should not be
overly alarmed if the nature of an evolving programme
takes a diﬀerent shape to the one originally envisaged,
and should adopt an open, self-reﬂective attitude,
recognising the changes rather than adhering rigidly
to the original description. For example, in the case of
ECCI, pilot work with secondary care staﬀ revealed
that the original vision of ubiquitous airline-style
booking of hospital appointments from general prac-
tice surgeries was not feasible or acceptable, although
the concept was applicable under certain circumstances
such as non-urgent appointments to particular spe-
cialties in speciﬁc hospitals. To reﬂect this, the ECCI
vision was reviewed and redrafted such that electronic
booking became an optional deliverable rather than a
central criterion for success.
When commissioning evaluation
research, recognise what can and
cannot be demonstrated in the
timescale and budget that you
are considering
Expecting an external evaluation team to produce data
to justify expenditure on a programme is fraught with
diﬃculties. Care should be taken when designing
competitive tenders not to stipulate the assessment of
inappropriate or undemonstrable outcomes and
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beneﬁts. Depending on their scope and relative dur-
ation, complex IM&Tprogrammeswill progress through
various stages along a continuum (sometimes referred
to as a technology cycle) which, over time, addresses
issues like concept development, needs assessment,
baselining, prototyping, infrastructure evolution, usabil-
ity testing, awareness raising, skills raising, process
re-engineering and so on, only later moving towards
widespread implementation. The objectives addressed
at each stage will be diﬀerent and hence diﬀerent
research questions and methods will be appropriate
for evaluating their success. For example, improve-
ments in cost-eﬀectiveness or eﬃciency are only likely
to become evident post-implementation and qualitat-
ive evaluation methods might be more appropriate in
the formative phases. It was recognised early in the
ECCI evaluation that the primary objective of the
programme was to replace paper with electronic means
of communication and it would be unrealistic to
expect major outcome changes, certainly in the short
term. Furthermore, it was evident that a detailed
analysis of time-based and quality measures would
necessitate far greater manpower than was available
to the research team, and could only be achieved by
utilising routinely collected datasets or seeking local
data collection from regional project teams. Explora-
tory discussions with the Information and Statistics
Division of the Scottish NHS revealed that the former
were unsuitable for demonstrating the desired out-
comes. A Delphi process with regional ECCI project
teams produced agreement to submitmonthly returns
for measures of ‘readiness’ (for example, systems in
place, users trained to use systems) and ‘use’ (such as
percentage of clinics or practices using the new system,
numbers of electronic versus paper transactions).
However, regional teams were not amenable to col-
lecting data that might, in the future, enable demon-
stration of changes in eﬃciency and quality, due to the
necessary time demands. Selected results from this
exercise are reproduced in the paper which accom-
panies this article, and elsewhere, and the larger data-
sets are now available in the public domain.10,12,13
For the NPfIT, the message is that measuring
intermediate outcomes is worthwhile for demonstrat-
ing the success of such programmes in the early stages.
Ideally evaluation should be approached as a pro-
gramme of research employing a range of methods
and should be supported for the duration of the
initiative. This needs to be resourced adequately.
Ten percent of budget is often quoted as the industry
standard for evaluation of new programmes. No
matter how reliable this estimate is, it is clear that
healthcare IM&T programmes are, on average, com-
mitting less than 1% of their total expenditure to
external (or internal) evaluation. Without compre-
hensive evaluation it will be impossible to demon-
strate the value of such programmes to the public and
this shortcoming should be addressed as a matter of
urgency. The ECCI evaluation was able to provide a
qualitative proﬁle of the programme’s evolution and
internal variation, develop and collect quantitative
measures of implementation, probe end-users’ re-
sponses to the systems, and facilitate activities via
constructive feedback. However, personnel and time
restrictions limited our ability to answer important
questions relating to cost-eﬀectiveness, quality and
eﬃciency. NPfIT should clarify their needs for evalu-
ation early in the process and take expert advice on
task requirements when budgeting for this.
There should be openness about the
processes of the programme and a
willingness to accept and respond to
feedback from objective observers
A classic failing of large-scale civic and industry pro-
jects is to adopt a secretive position whereby scrutiny
by ‘outsiders’ is discouraged. This can result in pro-
grammes being implemented at vast expense without
any objective evaluation being conducted or reported.
At the outset of the national programme the Scottish
IM&T Directorate made a refreshing break with this
tradition by commissioning two independent evalu-
ation projects – one focusing on the ECCI Programme
and one on NHS24, the Scottish equivalent of NHS
Direct. Our experience evaluating the former illus-
trated the anthropology of cultural change in this
context, as personnel moved from an understandable
position of suspicion to one of enthusiastic collabor-
ation. The time-scale for commissioning the evalu-
ation was not ideal in that the research commenced a
year after the oﬃcial programme start date and ended
before the implementation had bedded in. Nonethe-
less, key data collection procedures facilitated by the
research team remain in place. Our message for all
government departments is that they should foster a
culture where evaluation is regarded as a necessary and
central part of any new programme and not simply an
optional add-on.
Whether evaluation is to be internal or external,
programme planners should always build in eﬀective
means by which to monitor appropriate outcomes.
Comprehensive evaluation should encompass a range
of qualitative and quantitative approaches so as to
proﬁle the context, culture and process of change as
well as to measure its impact. Where appropriate,
consideration should be given to incorporating par-
ticipative evaluation techniques like action research,
which facilitate programme development rather than
pronouncing judgement at the end. These are com-
patible with business-derived methods, such as bene-
ﬁts management and continuous quality assessment,
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thus easing communication between independent
academics and health service managers. It is also
important to note that openness is not just about
evaluation, but also about sharing information on the
project’s plans, progress and results with the project
team, sponsors and, most importantly, with target
users and the public.
Human factors are as important as
technological ones in getting systems
into practice
An overarching theme is that changing individual and
organisational behaviour is themajor challenge of any
new IT implementation project. All too often large
programmes are destabilised by such things as nega-
tive attitudes, persistence with old ways of working,
disparate understanding of objectives and processes,
poor ﬁnancial planning and local politics.14–16 All of
these inﬂuences were observed to some extent during
ECCI but central support, including open forums for
sharingdiﬃculties and solutions, alongwith local project
ownership, engagement of regional clinical leads, and
organisational development and training initiatives,
helped to minimise their impact.
These are by no means the only messages to have
come out of the ECCI evaluation and the majority
represent general reﬂections on IM&T implementation
and are not speciﬁc to this initiative. Despite Scotland’s
relatively small size and the predominance of a single
general practice computing system (GPASS), the pro-
gramme emerged as a highly complex organism and
has encountered a range of obstacles in its lifetime,
most of which have been or are in the process of being
successfully tackled. Bearing in mind England’s larger
size and its arguablymore diverse population of IM&T
cultures, NPfIT is likely to be even more complex and
those tasked with its implementation are facing a
considerable challenge. We modestly oﬀer these re-
ﬂections and recommendations in the hope that they
might be of some assistance.
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